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Abstract
Blockchain is maintained as a global log between a network
of nodes and uses cryptographic distributed protocols to
synchronize the updates. As adopted by Bitcoin and Ethereum
these update operations to the ledger are serialized, and ex-
ecuted in batches. To safeguard the system against the gen-
eration of conflicting sets of updates and maintain the con-
sistency of the ledger, the frequency of the updates is con-
trolled, which severely affects the performance of the sys-
tem.
This paper presents Converging Directed Acyclic Graph
(CDAG), as a substitute for the chain and DAG structures
used in other blockchain protocols. CDAG allows multiple
parallel updates to the ledger and converges them at the
next step providing finality to the blocks. It partitions the
updates into non-intersecting buckets of transactions to pre-
vent the generation of conflicting blocks and divide the time
into slots to provide enough time for them to propagate in
the network. Multiple simultaneous updates improve the
throughput of CDAG, and the converging step helps to fi-
nalize them faster, even in the presence of conflicts. More-
over, CDAG provides a total order among the blocks of the
ledger to support smart contracts, unlike some of the other
blockDAG protocols.
We evaluate the performance of CDAG on Google Cloud
Platformusing GoogleKubernetes Engine, simulating a real-
time network. Experimental results show that CDAG achieves
a throughput of more than 2000 transactions per second and
confirms them well in under 2 minutes. Also, the protocol
scales well in comparison to other permissioned protocols,
and the capacity of the network only limits the performance.
Keywords CDAG, blockchain, blockDAG, distributed time
barrier, bucketing of transactions
1 Introduction
Bitcoin, proposed in 2008 by a pseudonym named Satoshi
Nakamoto [19], introduced the first ever decentralized frame-
work to manage digital currency over a peer-to-peer net-
work. It stores transactions in a publicly available ledger
called the blockchain. Each block in the blockchain contains
a batch of transactions referring back to the latest known
block, constructing a chain of blocks. The consistency of
the ledger comes from the serial extension, as the newly
added block is legitimate only if it is consistent with the
chain. After Bitcoin other cryptocurrencies like Ethereum
[33], Litecoin [17] originate extending the functionality of
Bitcoin but using the same underlying blockchain structure.
To maintain the consistency of the ledger block genera-
tion rate is kept reasonably low because a higher rate can
result in forks and increase the risk of a double spend. Also,
creating larger blocks with more number of transactions re-
sults in higher propagation time, which in turn refrains the
system to scale. [9, 26] discuss in detail about the security
problems that originate because of high block generation
rate or increasing the block size for the blockchain.
BlockDAG [29] is introduced as an alternate structure to
address the issue of the scalability of blockchain. It over-
comes the problem of low transaction throughput by sup-
porting very high block generation rate and arrange the pro-
posed blocks in a Directed Acyclic Graph instead of a chain.
However, the performance still degrades in the presence of
conflicting blocks because of their sophisticated transaction
confirmation strategies. Also, due to high block generation
rates, the probability of concurrent blocks having the same
transactions is high. It is indistinguishable from the case of
having blocks with double-spend transactions since in both
the scenarios, only one of the proposed blocks gets accepted
for the final ledger and other needs to be discarded. Thus,
the orphan rate for DAG can still have high values, even in
the absence of any conflicting transactions in real life de-
ployments.
This paper describes Converging Directed Acyclic Graph
(CDAG), a new structure to maintain a consistent and dis-
tributed ledger over a peer-to-peer network. CDAG is a hy-
brid structure of blockchain and blockDAG,designed to achieve
the best of both worlds. It progresses serially similar to the
blockchainand can handlemultiple simultaneous blocks anal-
ogous to the blockDAG. Splitting the transactions into non-
intersecting buckets enable the block proposers to generate
multiple non-conflicting blocks simultaneously, and divid-
ing the time into slots with the help of a Distributed Time
Barrier grants them enough time to disseminate in the net-
work.
Blocks in CDAG converge after each step into a single
block known as the Converging Block (C-Block) which is the
point of reference for the next set of blocks. Adding C-Block
at each step enables the ledger to progress as a chain and
maintain a total ordering among the blocks. However, tem-
porary forks can occur because the ledger progresses as a
chain. CDAG handles it by using a variant of the heaviest
chain protocol [26] to confirm transactions irreversibly in
an acceptable amount of time.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2
discusses the related work. Section 3 provides a summary
of the previous work extended in this paper. Section 4 de-
scribes the design of the protocol. Section 5 and 6 discuss
the details of CDAG and describe the block proposal mecha-
nism. Section 7 provides a security analysis of the protocol.
Section 8 and 9 tells about the implementation and evalua-
tion of the protocol. Finally, we discuss the limitations and
indicate future directions in Section 10, and conclude our
work in Section 11.
2 Related Work
2.1 Chains
The chain is a fundamental and most commonly used struc-
ture for the blockchain. Blocks of transactions extending the
chain are added periodically one after the other, linked cryp-
tographically to their previous blocks. Nodes mine these
blocks for the chain to get the associated reward. Bitcoin
uses proof-of-work often called as “Nakamoto consensus" to
mine blocks, named after the creator of bitcoin. Participants
try to solve a hard cryptographic puzzle, and the first one to
get through proposes the block. Nodes require massive in-
frastructure to participate, and the problem is set too hard
such that probabilistically only a single node can generate a
block every 10 minutes. It incurs a lot of resource wastage,
and throughput of the system still suffers. Moreover, due to
the possibility of forks, users wait for the chain to grow at
least six blocks before considering a transaction confirmed
[2], i.e., an hour of waiting. Many follow-up cryptocurren-
cies like [10, 17, 34] adopted the bitcoin’s proof-of-work and
inherited its limitations.
CDAG, on the contrary, allows a set of nodes in each
round to propose blocksof transactions simultaneously from
distinct buckets. Valid proposals from different proposers
are added to the ledger in parallel, extending the ledger as a
converging DAG, unlike a chain of blocks used in Bitcoin. It
helps CDAG to gain efficiency and increase the throughput
of the system.
Bitcoin-NG [11] takes a step forward to use proof-of-work
to elect a leader for a time epoch, and let that leader propose
blocks until the next leader gets elected. It improves the per-
formance, but a single leader for each epoch is susceptible
to an attack. CDAG also progresses in time slots, but there
is no unique leader to propose blocks. Multiple proposers
simultaneously try to introduce blocks from different buck-
ets. It prevents the system against denial of services (DOS)
attacks and ensures the progress of the protocol.
Algorand [13] use anonymous committee selection to pro-
pose blocks and perform voting to select the one amongst
them to be added to the ledger. It utilizes network band-
width to propagaten number of blocks, but finally adds only
one amongst them to the ledger. It results in under-utilization
of the network resources and compromises on the achiev-
able throughput. CDAG try to maximize the throughput by
allowing the blocks from multiple proposers to get added
to the ledger concurrently. It tries to exploit the network
resources and also gains on throughput.
2.2 Trees and DAGs
Other than chains, structures like trees and directed acyclic
graph (DAG) have gained eminence lately. GHOST [26]mod-
ifies the chain selection rule of Bitcoin to select the heavi-
est sub-tree instead of longest chain at a fork. It selects the
branch with the highest mining power concentration, pro-
viding better security guarantees than original bitcoin, with
higher block generation rates and improved fairness. CDAG
also grows like a tree with multiple child blocks at each step,
but they converge at the next step trying to commit a maxi-
mum possible of them. The protocol tries to add all the non-
conflicting child blocks to the ledger, unlike [26] where only
a single child block ends up in the final chain. It results in
better performance and supports even higher block genera-
tion rates.
Spectre [25] uses directed acyclic graphs as the underly-
ing structure for the ledger instead of chains for increasing
Bitcoins throughput. Blocks in [25] points to all the leaf
blocks visible to the proposer and resolve conflicts based
on the number of direct and derived links for the concerned
blocks. It supports a very high block generation rate in com-
parison to the original bitcoin blockchainand also scales eas-
ily without compromising on the security. However, Spec-
tre provides only pairwise ordering between the blocks and
not total-ordering which makes it unsuitable for Smart Con-
tracts [28] based blockchaindeployments like Ethereum.More-
over, it is possible that a block added in the DAG may not
ever get confirmed in the presence of conflicting transac-
tions [24]. CDAG, on the other side, converges by design at
each step and thus supports smart contracts. Conflicts can
occur in the form of forks but are resolved irreversibly as
long as a majority of nodes are working towards extending
the heaviest branch.
Phantom [27] is also a blockDAG based protocol that pro-
vides a total ordering among the blocks added to the ledger.
It makes Phantom suitable for smart contracts, but the per-
formance degrades severely in the presence of conflicting
blocks. Moreover, in both [25, 27] there is no mechanism
for the proposers to generate distinct blocks.Multiple blocks
proposed at small intervals possess a high probability of hav-
ing conflicts, which can result in higher orphan rate (per-
centage of the proposed blocks not included in the ledger)
in real-time systems. CDAG addresses this issue by divid-
ing the unconfirmed transactions pool into multiple buck-
ets. Multiple proposers randomly select buckets to propose
blocks, reducing the probability of the generation of conflict-
ing blocks and therefore decreasing the orphan rate.
3 Background
CDAG is a structure to store blocks of transactions proposed
for a ledger. It can accommodate multiple blocks proposed
simultaneously but requires a distributed consensus proto-
col to select the proposers for each round. CDAGuses Colos-
seum to select block proposers for each of the time slot and
add the blocks generated by them to the ledger.
Colosseum
Colosseum [14] is a scalable consensus protocol to elect a
random subset of nodes from a peer-to-peer network. It is
designed for permissioned blockchain networks where the
identity of participants are known. Colosseum follows a cu-
rative approach towards consensus rather than a preventive
approach followed by all the voting based algorithms like
[6]. It assumes that adversaries are not always present in a
network, but efficiently detects them and alerts the network;
whereas the traditional Byzantine Fault Tolerant consensus
algorithms work on the assumption that traitors are always
present in the network. Such a design assumption brings
down the message complexity of Colosseum and allows the
protocol to scale.
Colosseum arranges the participants in a structured ring
network forming aDistributed HashTable (DHT) [32]. These
participants engage in knockout tournaments to win and get
elected as block proposers. A tournament in Colosseum con-
sists of log2 N (N is the number of participants) asynchro-
nous rounds. Nodes play matches in pair of two for each
round and accept the winners of α (α < log2 N ) number of
rounds as the proposers for that tournament. The elected
proposers can then propose a block for the blockchain and
propagate them in the network along with their Proof-of-
Win (PoWin). PoWin is a cryptographically secured, tamper-
proof certificate designed to get communicated and stored
as the outcome of matches in Colosseum. The receivers val-
idate the PoWin and the proposed block and push it into the
ledger.
Members of Colosseum compete in a fair and randomized
two-player game to select the winner and rely upon arbi-
trary members on the ring to validate and verify the result.
Each match in the tournament consists of four stages. First,
a node finds an eligible competitor for the match by send-
ing TCP requests [20] to other members. Eligible players
respond positively providing the PoWin of their previous
round while others acknowledge negatively. Second, play-
ers need to create their Game Proposal for the two-player
game. Cryptographic techniques are used to ensure that the
nodes generate randombut verifiable gameproposals. It helps
to have a fair winner as none of the participants can fal-
sify the process. Third, competitors send their proposals to
a randomly selected validator on the DHT, which is unam-
biguously identifiable for a particular match. It validates the
proposals of both the players and constructs the resulting
certificate (i.e., PoWin) by comparing the proposals. Fourth,
the result is sent back to the players and their keepers by the
validator. Multiple keepers are assigned to both the partici-
pants of a match to store their state on the network. These
keepers follow a weak consistency approach where the val-
idator sends the results to some random keepers and the
keepers then gossip it to other keeper nodes.Moreover, nodes
on receiving the result also forward it to the keepers tomain-
tain the consistency among all the keeper replicas.
Finally, winners move forward to play the next round or
propose a block if they meet the qualifying condition (i.e.,
have won α number of rounds), whereas the losers wait for
the start of the next tournament. Simultaneously, keepers
verify the results received by them with the keepers of the
previous round. It is required tomake sure that only thewin-
ners of a round proceed to the next round and vote against
the players playing unauthorized matches. A match on re-
ceiving more than two-third of negative votes from its keep-
ers is considered as a foul. These fouls impact the priority
of the blocks proposed by nodes and lowers their chances
of being in the final ledger.
4 Design
Converging Directed Acyclic Graph (CDAG) is proposed as
an alternate data-structure to store data of a distributed ledger
across a peer-to-peer network. It is similar to the traditional
blockchain as it can be visualized as a chain and inspired
fromblockDAG tohandlemultiple simultaneous blocks. CDAG
introduces Converging Block (C-Block) as a new construct
to the structure of the ledger. C-Block is a converging point
for the blocks in CDAG unlike other blockDAG protocols
which do not have any single point of convergence (i.e., a
block such that others are either before it or after it, making
it a confirmation point for all previous blocks and last point
of reference for the future blocks). Moreover, CDAG is intro-
duced as an easy to understand andmaintain structure, with
more straightforward conflict resolution technique, which
makes it desirable for blockchain systems.
Timeline in CDAG is divided into slots enforced by a dis-
tributed time barrier (DTB). Each tournament of Colosseum
directly maps to one of the slots created by DTB. Multi-
ple block proposers selected in one slot extend CDAG by
proposing blocks from randombuckets of transactions. They
make the blocks consistent with the previous heaviest branch
and disseminate in the network. The barrier between the
two time slots provides adequate time for the proposed blocks
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Figure 1. Timeline in CDAG with τ = 20s
to scatter in the network to increase their chances of con-
verging at the next step; whereas bucketing of the trans-
actions prevents them from generating intersecting blocks
(blockswith the same transactions) because all of them have
the same set of unconfirmed transactions.
4.1 Distributed Time Barrier
As the name suggests, Distributed Time Barrier (DTB) is a
time-based barrier to force the nodes of a network to halt
for a particular time. Having a barrier allows CDAG to gen-
erate multiple simultaneous blocks since they will get the
required time to scatter, and also restrict the nodes from
moving ahead and generate more blocks until allowed. It
plays a significant role in the convergence of CDAG at each
stage, because, better the blocks propagate in the network
more is their chance to get added to the ledger.
DTB maps each time slot exclusively to a tournament of
Colosseum. Nodes need to wait for τ seconds after the start
of a tournament to play the next tournament. Figure 1 shows
the division of time into slots of 20 seconds and each slot ini-
tiating a new tournament. Nodes participate in these tour-
naments to qualify and propose blocks for the ledger. The
proposed blocks can propagate until the proposers from the
next tournament get selected, as shown in figure 1. It gives
them approximately τ amount of time to scatter in the net-
work irrespective of the time of a tournament but is valid
only if the average completion time for the tournaments is
less than τ and multiple consecutive tournaments do not
overlap.
CDAG uses Proof of Elapsed Time (PoET) [15] to enforce
waiting on the nodes. PoET with the help of Intel Software
Guard Extension [16] provides a framework to run trusted
code on an untrusted host, which others can verify. Nodes
need to provide the PoET certificate of waiting τ seconds af-
ter the start of tournament t to play tournament t + 1. Each
certificate contains a hash used to initialize the waiting for
the next slot. These hashes are linked to each other such
that nodes can start waiting for a particular tournament
only after the successful generation of the PoET certificate
for the previous tournament. Competitors verify these cer-
tificates while pairing to decide whether to play a match or
not. It restricts the participants frommoving ahead of others
and thus fulfill the requirement of a time barrier across the
network. The barrier makes them advance synchronously
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Figure 2. Bucketing of transactions
tournament-by-tournament and grants equal chance for the
blocks of all the proposers of a tournament to reach a ma-
jority of the users.
However, nodes in CDAG need not be completely syn-
chronous. Time difference of a few milliseconds (500 - 1000
ms) between the participants does not affect the tournaments
since τ is set sufficiently high. Still, as the process of wait-
ing at the barrier is independent, clocks of players can drift
apart further. Such nodes lacking behind need to poll the
trusted oracles present in the network to reinitialize the state
of their barrier. These trusted oracles also wait at the barrier
along with the network and provide the bootstrap informa-
tion for the trusted code precisely at the time of the start
of the next slot. It also works similarly for the newly joined
nodes in the system to get the bootstrap information and
synchronize with others.
4.2 Bucketing of transactions
CDAG generates multiple blocks in each slot concurrently,
and there is a high probability of the same transactions be-
ing included by multiple proposers in their blocks because
of a single pool of unconfirmed transactions. Proposers can
unknowingly produce conflicting blocks even in the absence
of double-spending transactions and can increase the orphan
rate (the percentage of proposed blocks not included in the
final chain) of the protocol. [25, 27] encounters the same is-
sue because of their high block generation rate.
Transactions in CDAG are distributed among different
buckets to counter this problem. The unconfirmed transac-
tions are split acrossB non-intersecting transaction pools by
the nodes. Each transaction maps to a single bucket based
on its hash, as shown in equation (1). Proposers randomly
select a bucket and include transactions only belonging to
the particular bucket to generate a valid block. Blocks that
belong to different buckets are assured of having different
transactions and thus, limits the probability of the gener-
ation of conflicting blocks. The number of buckets is kept
sufficiently high from the expected number of proposers
to avoid any collisions in bucket selection. Also, proposers
propagate the block headers in the network before sending
Figure 3. Structure of CDAG
the actual block to inform other proposers about the choice
of the bucket. Block headers are comparatively smaller than
the actual block and spread faster across the network, fur-
ther minimizing the chances of creating conflicting blocks.
Bucket Id = (Transaction Hash)mod B (1)
However, dividing transactions merely by their hashes
do not protect the system against double-spending conflicts.
Two transactions trying to spend the same money can have
different hashes and may end up in different buckets. There-
fore, blocks from different buckets can also conflict. CDAG
handle such conflictswhile converging these blocks andmakes
sure that it does not add multiple blocks containing dou-
ble spending transactions to the ledger. Thus, the protocol
works on its full potential as long as the users do not double-
spend and can resolve the conflicts efficiently in comparison
to others by using the heaviest branch selection mechanism
of CDAG.
5 Converging DAG
CDAG is a blockDAG based distributed ledger which con-
verges at each step to provide finality to the blocks. It is
a serialized DAG designed to support smart contracts and
quickly arrive at conclusions in the presence of conflicting
transactions. It tries tomaximize the throughput of blockchain
systems and better utilize network resources.
CDAG uses Colosseum to elect multiple block proposers
for each time slot. These proposers select a random bucket
to generate blocks consistent with a Converging Block (C-
Block) and disseminate it into the network. CDAG constructs
C-Block as a collection of the blocks proposed in a round
and works as a single point of reference for the newly gener-
ated ones. It enables CDAG to progress as a chain and shares
the same trust model as the traditional blockchain (blocks
of transactions linked to each other progressing as a mod-
ifications resistant ledger). Progress as a chain can create
temporary forks, and thus, CDAG uses the heaviest chain
selection approach to have faster conclusions.
5.1 C-Block
C-Block (Converging block) is the converging point in CDAG.
It is introduced as an extra layer between two layers of blocks
providing a point of convergence to the blocks of the previ-
ous slot and a single point of reference for all the blocks of
the current slot, shown in Figure 3. As multiple blocks are
recommended for the ledger in each slot, a C-Block refers
to various non-conflicting blocks and contains the list of
hashes of all the previous blocks it refers. A block consis-
tent with a C-Block is bound to be consistent with all the
blocks included in it. It allows the current block proposers
to refer multiple blocks with a single link and enables differ-
ent proposers to have the same view about the ledger.
Creation of C-Block is also the responsibility of the block
proposers. While proposing a block, a proposer needs to
make it consistent with a C-Block and includes a pointer to
it. To do so, a proposer can either generate a new C-Block
or use an existing C-Block created and propagated by other
selected proposers of the same tournament. In case of a con-
flict, the heaviest chain rule is used to select the C-Block
with higher probability to survive.
Generating a valid C-Block is a trivial process, and obeys
a specific set of rules. Proposers need to make sure that all
the blocks included in a C-Block must: 1) belong to differ-
ent buckets, 2) have non-conflicting transactions, 3) refer
to the same previous C-Block. The first rule ensures that a
C-Block does not contain conflicting blocks due to the pres-
ence of the same transactions. Second does not allow double
spending transactions in a C-Block, and third provides the
serial nature to CDAG. Blocks of a tournament with differ-
ent previous C-Blocks are similar to a fork in the traditional
blockchain. In figure 3 the block of bucket 9 points to a dif-
ferent C-Block than that of buckets 5, 6, 2 at tournament 4,
i.e., the previous blocks of both the C-Blocks are different,
creating a fork. Thus, the structure progresses as a chain
where a C-Block can be seen as a large block encapsulating
all the blocks included in its list.
5.2 Total ordering for Smart Contracts
CDAG is designed as an alternate to other blockDAG based
blockchain protocols to incorporate smart contracts. Phan-
tom [27] also supports smart contracts by providing order-
ing between the blocks but is not as intuitive as provided
by CDAG. Blocks in CDAG are ordered at two levels, and
together it ensures a total ordering among all the blocks
added in the main branch of the ledger, similar to a bitcoin
blockchain. First, the arrangement of C-Block provides a
higher level order in CDAG. Since CDAG extends as a chain
of C-Blocks, blocks included in the predecessor (C-Block)
of a block are inherently behind the current block. Second,
Figure 4. Possible leaf blocks formation while the genera-
tion of C-Block where Blocks with horizontal stripes con-
flict with each other.
a lower level ordering is provided in between the blocks in-
cluded in a C-Block. These blocks are ordered based on their
block hash resulting in an inter-block ordering. Such blocks
do not refer to each other but are non-conflicting by nature
as they are present in the same C-Block. Together both the
properties provide the required total ordering at block level
among the blocks of CDAG.
5.3 Heaviest chain selection
Heaviest chain selection in CDAG follows a greedy approach
towards extending the chain with the highest probability to
be the main chain. [26] motivates the chain extension algo-
rithm used by CDAG, with a difference of trying to extend
the chain of C-Blocks instead of regular blocks. The base
assumption for the algorithm is that a majority of nodes in
the system are honest and try to identify and report any
unauthorized activity. It relies on the negative voting done
against malicious nodes in Colosseum to identify honest
blocks and branches. Votes against nodes reduce the priority
of their blocks and therefore reduce its chance to be included
in the main chain.
Each block in CDAG has an associated weight w which
depends on the number of successfully verified matches of
its proposer. Maximum weight for a block is α correspond-
ing to the α number of wins gained to propose it. Foul (a
match that is known to be unauthorized because of major-
ity voting against it by the keepers of Colosseum) by nodes
negatively affect the weight of these blocks. Each foul de-
crease the weight of the corresponding block by one unit
resulting in low priority. Participants consider these votes
while the generation of C-Block and decide whether to in-
clude a block or not.
The total weight of a chainW is the sum of the weights
of all the blocks present in it. Nodes use it at two decision-
making points during the tournaments. First, when a node
needs to propose a block and has multiple C-Blocks to con-
sider as a reference. It is similar to a fork in the blockchain,
and the proposer needs to select the chain with the high-
est likelihood to survive. Second, when proposers need to
generate a C-Block. Proposers need to maximize the weight
of the chain they are proposing their block to by including
the heaviest subset of non-conflicting blocks from the set of
proposed blocks. In such a situation there can be multiple
cases as shown in figure 4, 1) A single chain with no con-
flicting blocks; 2) A single chain with conflicts; 3) A forked
chain with none of the chain having conflicting proposals;
4) A forked chain with conflicting block in both the chains
or one of the chain. The first case is simple, where the pro-
poser includes all the blockswhile constructing the C-Block.
In the second case, the proposer needs to select the heavier
block among the conflicting blocks to include to the chain.
In the third case, the proposer selects the heaviest of themul-
tiple forks to construct the ledger, whereas in the fourth case
the proposer first sorts the conflicts in-between the forks
and then select the heaviest branch amongst them. More-
over, in the case when multiple conflicting blocks have the
same weight, the block of the proposer with a smaller Id is
considered. It ensures uniform generation of C-Block across
the network, given all of them have received the proposed
blocks and the negative votes by the keepers.
6 Block Proposal
Nodes with α number of wins in a tournament of Colos-
seum are eligible to propose a block for CDAG. First, they
select the heaviest C-Block to mark it as a reference in the
new block, then proposes a block referencing the selected
C-Block as the previous block. It attaches its latest PoWin
(of the round number α ) in the block header and propagates
it into the network.
Each tournament of Colosseum can have a maximum of
log(N ) (N is the number of nodes) rounds; therefore, α is al-
ways set as α < log(N ) to have multiple block proposers for
a tournament. CDAG tries to commit all the non-conflicting
blocks simultaneously using CDAG. It helps to utilize the
bandwidth of the network better and decrease resourcewastage.
Blocks proposed by different nodes from distinct parts of the
network propagate simultaneously, as compare to a single
block getting propagated. It allows them to scatter in the en-
tire network in almost the same amount of time as a single
block without any extra cost. The distributed time barrier
across tournaments also supports the design decision as it
provides adequate time for the blocks to scatter in the net-
work.
6.1 Multiple blocks per tournament
Allowing multiple block proposers to propose concurrently
can escalate the generation of conflicting blocks because of
the same unconfirmed transaction pool. Blocks can conflict
in two ways. First, when two different blocks have an inter-
section (i.e., contains the same transactions). Second, when
there is a double-spend across two blocks. The second one
is a deliberate attempt, but the first issue occurs only be-
cause of the delays in the network. A proposer not aware of
the blocks proposed by others can unknowingly generate a
conflicting block.
CDAGuses bucketing of transactions tominimize the prob-
ability of the generation of intersecting blocks. However,
bucketing does not resolve the conflicts that occur due to
double-spend transactions. Such conflicts are resolved dur-
ing the generation of C-Block by the block proposers of the
next tournament. A C-Block contains the pointers to the
previous blocks and is the point of reference for the newer
blocks (similar to a previous block in blockchain). A valid
C-Block does not contain pointers to multiple conflicting
blocks. Thus, as long as a majority of the nodes extends the
heaviest chain with valid C-Blocks, a double-spend cannot
be successful.
Generating multiple blocks simultaneously also elevate
the problem of having total ordering between the blocks.
Blocks introduced concurrently or at small interval are un-
aware of the other proposals and do not align in an order.
The design of C-Block handles this problem and also pro-
vides order to the structure. Since a C-Block collects only
non-conflicting blocks into it and their hashes are arranged
in sorted order, multiple blocks included to CDAG in a sin-
gle slot are inherently ordered. Moreover, a higher level or-
der is provided by the arrangement of CDAG as a chain of
C-Blocks resulting in a total order among the blocks.
6.2 Waiting time for Distributed barrier
Each participant of the network waits for τ amount of time
after the start of a tournament to play the next tournament.
Choice of τ severely impacts the performance of the pro-
tocol since multiple blocks are being generated simultane-
ously. A small value of τ does not provide enough time for
the proposed blocks to reach everyone in the network. It
can lead to a fork in the chain as there exist multiple com-
binations in which a node can commit blocks to the ledger.
Proposers of the next slot will propose blocks according to
their view of the network, which can lead to an increase in
the orphan rate of the protocol and also affect the latency.
Hence, CDAG prefers to have a large enough value of τ be-
cause with multiple blocks per tournament and not enough
time to propagate forking can be harmful to the safety of
the protocol. It is also a significant reason to impose wait-
ing on the nodes explicitly with the help of distributed time
barrier.
The value of the waiting time (τ ) depends on external as
well as internal factors. External factors are the parameters
that do not depend on the protocol like bandwidth, the num-
ber of nodes and internal factors are the tunable parame-
ters of the protocol, such as α and block size. τ is directly
proportional to the number of nodes and block size. The
number of nodes in the network and the size of the block
both increase the time required for the blocks to scatter in
the network. Larger network size increases the number of
matches played in the tournament to qualify which also re-
quires more time. τ is inversely proportional to the network
bandwidth as higher bandwidth decreases the tournament
completion and block scatter time. However, the relation be-
tween τ and α is not straightforward. The time required for
higher values of α increases because of the increase in the
number of matches per tournament, and decrease because
the number of qualifying nodes per tournament will drop,
resulting in fewer blocks. Indirectly it depends on the exter-
nal factors (i.e., bandwidth and number of nodes) to decide
whether the overall effect is positive or negative.
7 Security Analysis
Securing blockchain systems is a significant concern. Mali-
cious nodes can try to undermine the security of the system
for their gain. Therefore, a blockchain protocol must be able
to tackle adversaries and continue to work as long as the
majority of the nodes in the system are honest. This section
reviews such problems and discusses the countermeasures
adopted in CDAG and Colosseum.
7.1 Irreversible transaction confirmation
Transaction confirmation is an essential aspect for all the
blockchain systems. A transaction, once confirmed, must be
irreversible to avoid a double spend. In bitcoin blockchain,
confirmation of a block depends on its depth in the chain,
but CDAG has a subtle difference. Multiple blocks get added
to CDAG in each time slot, and the deepest chain may not
be the one to which the majority of the participants are con-
tributing. Therefore, Colosseum introduces the concept of
“full-confirmation” for CDAG. A block is said to receive one
full-confirmation when it has δ (maximum expected blocks
or block proposers from a tournament) number of blocks
ahead of it. Equation (2) shows how to compute δ for a given
network where N is the number of nodes and α is the num-
ber of wins required in Colosseum to propose a block.
δ =
⌊
N
2α
⌋
(2)
A block can get a full-confirmation in a minimum of one
and a maximum of δ number of tournaments. It is because
the maximum number of blocks that can be added to the
ledger in a slot is δ and the minimum is 1. The blocks pro-
posed in a tournament can have conflicts or may not reach
everyone in the given time slot due to network delays re-
sulting in a variable number of blocks getting added to the
ledger. In such cases, a full-confirmation may span up to
multiple tournaments.
In CDAG, a block is considered as confirmed when it re-
ceives x full-confirmations in less than 2x number of tourna-
ments. It ensures that on an average more than 50% of the
expected blocks (one half of δ ) are added to the branch in
which the block is present for each tournament (i.e., a ma-
jority of the network is contributing to the current branch
continuously for a set of previous tournaments) and a hid-
den chain heavier than the current chain does not exist. It
alsomakes sure that a fork cannot reverse a confirmed trans-
action because it needs more than δ/2 number of blocks per
tournament for almost 2x number of tournaments. In both
cases, greater than 50% of the nodes (i.e., majority of the net-
work) are required to extend the malicious chain. Therefore,
as long as the majority of users in Colosseum are honest, a
valid transaction cannot be reversed.
7.2 Byzantine faults
Nodes in the system can go rogue. They can perform mali-
cious activities which favors them to take control of the sys-
tem. CDAGdepends on Colosseum for the selection of block
proposers and can reasonably affect the progress and secu-
rity of CDAG. Users play three roles in Colosseum: Player,
Validator and Keeper. As a player, a malicious node can try
to cheat and win, whereas validators and keepers can avoid
their tasks of validation and verification tomake other nodes
suffer.
Malicious Player. Players in Colosseum need to find other
players and contest in amatch. These players can try to play
multiple matches for the same round with different oppo-
nents in order to increase their chances of moving to the
next round. Keepers in Colosseum can easily detect such
matches and can alert other nodes in the system with ver-
ifiable proof. Result of the matches of the same round will
land up with the same keeper replicas nodes and results in
verifiable proof propagated in the network.
MaliciousValidator.A validator in Colosseum collects the
proposals from the players, compute the result and acknowl-
edgewith a Proof-of-Win. He is also responsible for sending
the result to the keeper. In the casewhen an adversarial node
is selected as the validator he may choose, 1) Not to reply, 2)
Send result to players but not the keepers, 3) Send result to
the keepers but not the players, 4) Send result to only one
of the players and not to keepers, 5) Send delayed reply to
the players.
In the first case both the nodes will timeout, check with
the keepers (both their and opponent’s) if they got the re-
sult and move forward to play the same round with new
competitors on being unsuccessful. The second case can re-
sult in keepers voting against the players for not receiving
the proof-of-win. To prevent it nodes on receiving the re-
sult forward it to some of their keepers and the keepers gos-
sip it forward. The third case is indistinguishable from the
first case for the players as they will timeout and poll the
keepers for the result, but this time the query will be suc-
cessful. Fourth further gets divided into two subcases based
on the player receiving the result is a winner or a loser. If
the player is a winner, he will forward the certificate to its
keepers such that they do not vote against him. The second
player will find this Proof-of-Win (because same result cer-
tificate for both the players) from the keepers and will not
proceed forward to play the same round again. On the other
hand, if the receiving node was a loser and does not share
the result with the keeper, both the nodes can play the same
round again as nobody in the system knows about thematch
other than the losing node and the malicious validator. It is
not fair to both the players but does affect the safety of the
protocol. Also, it is similar to the first case when none of the
players receives the result and both of them proceed. Also,
random validator selection makes sure that such scenarios
do not occur frequently.
The fifth case is more hazardous than others for honest
players in Colosseum. A player waiting for a response from
the validator may timeout and start finding a new opponent
for the same round again. This situation is indistinguish-
able from the case when a player is trying to play multiple
matches for the same round and can lead to the detection
of an honest node as malicious. To prevent this situation of
having a false-positive an honest node proceeds if he wins
both the matches, i.e., he is the winner of the match whose
result is received after the timeout and also wins the sec-
ond match played. In case he lost the first match, he was in-
tended to stop playing, which is fair and happens the same
in this case. However, if he wins the first match and loses the
second, he still needs to stop moving forward to not to get
marked as malicious by the participants. Whereas, a node
with both wins can play further and is not considered ma-
licious. It is because, if a player knows that he has won, he
will not try to play for the same round again as doing this
can mark it as malicious if he loses by any chance. There-
fore, keepers consider it as an honest mistake and do not
send alerts in the network. However, it does not protects
the malicious players trying to play multiple matches for a
round as they need to win all of them to proceed in the tour-
nament.
MaliciousKeeper.Keeper plays the role of storing the state
of nodes on the network, verifying their previous state and
notify the network of any unauthorized activity. Multiple
random nodes are selected as the keepers of a match to have
a fault tolerant storage. However, one or more of these keep-
ers may get compromised and do not perform their tasks
correctly. A keepermay, 1) Not verify a matchwhose PoWin
is received, 2) not store the state with it, 3) send false alerts
about unauthorized plays, 4) vote against matches of honest
nodes. Most of these problems for the keepers of Colosseum
gets solved because of their replication across the network.
The honest counterparts will verify matches not verified by
a malicious keeper. The state is stored at multiple nodes dis-
tributed over the entire network, and therefore, votes of a
few dishonest nodes do not affect the final result for the
players. Also, the keepers cannot generate false alerts as an
alert requires proof of unauthorized play (multiple Proof-of-
Win for the same round or Proof-of-Win for a higher round
number of a player already lost in previous rounds).
Moreover, malicious nodes can masquerade as keepers
and validator nodes for the matches because all the nodes
in Colosseum are arranged in a DHT and are generally re-
sponsible for storing data for a range of keys. They can try to
generate PoWin’s and cast votes on behalf of others. Colos-
seum uses a simpler form of DHT where nodes know all the
other nodes present on the ring, making it challenging to
masquerade others. Also, an honest node can easily detect
and alert the system against such messages as the expected
churn rate for the network is less and the participants are
mostly known. Furthermore, researchers have extensively
studied these topics in the past, and there are various solu-
tions like [5, 30, 31], any one or a combination of them can
be used with our protocol to improve and secure the mes-
sages over the DHT.
7.3 Bypassing Distributed time Barrier
Recent works (e.g., [3, 4]) suggest that bypassing the trusted
execution environments (TEE) and undermining the verifi-
cation process of PoET is possible. Colosseum assures that
as long as a majority of the nodes in the network are honest,
the protocol continues to work synchronously.
A match between two players depends on random valida-
tors and keepers. These nodes do not process a message if
the difference between the tournament number of the user’s
currents state and any received message is more than one.
Therefore, it is difficult for malicious players to enter a tour-
nament not started for others. Dependency on other nodes
indirectly forces everyone to move collectively. Thus, the
model supports the idea of the distributed barrier and pre-
vents adversarial nodes from undermining its entirety.
7.4 Liveliness vs Safety
A consensus protocol cannot guarantee both liveliness and
safety for asynchronous networks, as stated by the FLP im-
possibility result [12]. CDAG chooses liveliness over safety.
It guarantees liveliness as long as the majority of the se-
lected proposers for the tournaments of Colosseum are hon-
est and extend the heaviest chain of C-Blocks. A transaction
in CDAG gets committed if the majority of the network is
Parameter Meaning Value
α number of wins required to propose a block 4
K keeper replication factor 16
τ Distributed barrier delay in sec 20 sec
B number of buckets of transactions 40
F minimum full confirmations to confirm a block 3
Table 1. Tunable parameters in the protocol
working towards extending the heaviest chain, as described
in section 7.1, and more than one branch cannot have ma-
jority of blocks simultaneously makes sure that eventually
blocks get confirmed and nodes reach to a consensus, but
not in the case of network partitions. However, safety is not
guaranteed by CDAG because temporary forks can occur,
i.e., two honest nodes can have different truths at some point
in time but get resolved irreversibly.
8 Implementation
We implemented CDAG and Colosseum in JAVA consisting
of all the elements that are significant to analyze its perfor-
mance. For the underlying network, we use Vishwa [21] a
peer-to-peer grid computingmiddleware . It uses ZonalServer
(trusted oracle in case of Colosseum) to manage the under-
lying structured network in Colosseum which forms a DHT
and provides bootstrap information to newly joined nodes.
Colosseum uses a similar network model and is, therefore,
a perfect match.
In our implementation user on receiving a message gos-
sips it to three nodes (two randomnodes from the routing ta-
ble and an immediate successor) in the structured layer. All
themessages are digitally signed and also contain the public-
key certificates of the user (we can also broadcast public-key
certificates initially to save the overhead). We use waiting to
simulate the behavior of PoET for the distributed time bar-
rier. A block contains the header, PoWin and dummy data
instead of actual transactions.
Table 1 shows all the tunable parameters in the protocol
with their default values unless specifically mentioned for
experiments.We set theminimumnumber of full-confirmations
required to consider a block as confirmed to 3. The keeper
replication factor is set to 16 for all the experiments but de-
pends on the scale of the system.
9 Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of CDAG for different sizes of
network and vary the percentage of malicious users present
in it. The experiments measure the throughput and show
the variation in the latency and orphan rate of the protocol
for three different configurations, as shown in table 2. The
results demonstrate that how CDAG scales with the num-
ber of nodes by tuning some hyper-parameters and still give
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5. Throughput, Latency and Orphan rate of CDAG for α = 3
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 6. Throughput, Latency and Orphan rate of CDAG for α = 4
stable results. We also measure the performance of CDAG
under the influence of adversaries in the network and show
its effect on some of the performance parameters.
Configuration Block Size Time slot (τ )
Config 1 1 MB 20s
Config 2 0.75 MB 15s
Config 3 0.50 MB 10s
Table 2. Different configurations used in experiments
We deploy CDAG on Google Cloud Platform [7] using
Google Kubernetes Engine [8]. The Kubernetes cluster con-
sists of multiple n1-highmem-16 instances, each with 16vC-
PUs and 104 GB memory. Participants of CDAG are encap-
sulated in docker containers [18] and deployed on the clus-
ter with an upper and lower limit of twelve and eight docker
containers per instance and bandwidth constraint of 25Mbps
per docker container. We also make sure that multiple dock-
ers on the same instance also adhere to the bandwidth con-
straints. Users propose blocks of different sizes for different
set of configurations with 1 MByte equivalent to 2500-3000
transactions. Each experiment runs for at least 30 time slots
and the graphs in this section plots an average over all of
them.
9.1 Throughput
To measure the throughput (transactions/sec) of the proto-
col, we vary the number of nodes in the network for multi-
ple values ofα and all the three configurations asmentioned
in table 2. Both the graphs 5a and 6a shows that for a fixed
value of α the throughput of the system increases initially
with the number of nodes and then starts decreasing. The
initial increase is because the number of blocks for a tourna-
ment of Colosseum δ is directly proportional to the number
of nodes, as shown in equation (2). More number of nodes
results in a higher degree of parallelism for CDAG and thus,
increases the throughput. After a certain point, the through-
put starts decreasing for all the different configurations in
5a, 6a due to the generation of a large number of simultane-
ous blocks. Bandwidth constraints and network congestion
do not provide them enough time to reach everyone in the
network. Also, it is evident in both the graphs that the con-
figuration with smaller time slot τ (e.g., Config 3) saturates
before than the ones with a higher time slot (e.g., Config
1) even though the size of the block also increments in the
same ratio.
Across 5a and 6a the throughput of CDAG decrease for
the same network configuration. It is because, with the in-
crease in the value of α , the number of qualifying proposers
δ for a time slot decreases, as inferred from equation (2).
However, the saturation point shifts to a higher number of
nodes for larger values of α . It allows CDAG to scale with
the number of nodes. The value of α can be configured to
achieve the maximum throughput for a given configuration
of the network and can change with time similar to setting
the hardness of the cryptographic puzzle in Bitcoin.
Results show that CDAG achieves a throughput of ap-
prox 2100 transactions/sec with a network size of approx
300 nodes and can also scale further. It is 28.57% greater
than the on-chain transaction throughput of 1500 transac-
tions/sec [22] of ripple with the validator set ranging from
30 to 50 peers [23]. On the other hand, Hyperledger [1]
shows a throughput of 3500 transactions/second for about
100 peers. However, it uses very highly configured peers
with 16vCPUs and 1Gbps network link in the experimen-
tal setup, unlike CDAG which is tested using very nominal
resources as discussed earlier in this section.
9.2 Latency
Figure 5b, 6b shows the block confirmation time for different
configurations (ref table 2) with the increase in the number
of nodes in the network. It is evident that the block confir-
mation time for configurations with smaller τ is generally
lower in comparison to those having a large value of τ . It
is because the minimum confirmation time for a block is F
* τ , where F is the minimum full-confirmations required to
confirm a block and τ is the minimum time to get one full-
confirmation.
Network saturation also affects the latency of the proto-
col, similar to whatwas observed for throughput. Increasing
the number of block proposers (results from increasing the
number of nodes for a particular α ) beyond a limit lowers
the percentage of blocks getting added to the ledger for each
slot, resulting in an increase in the number of slots required
for a block to achieve one full-confirmation and therefore,
increasing the latency. Between 5b and 6b, the network with
a larger α has much more stable latency values for larger
network sizes as a result of the lower network traffic due to
lesser blocks in each slot. The saturation point also moves
forward for a higher value of α . It indicates towards a scal-
able blockchain protocol with acceptable latency values in
the order one minute.
9.3 Orphan rate
Orphan rate of the protocol shows a behavior similar to
the latency of CDAG since both of them are correlated. La-
tency in CDAG is derived from the percentage of blocks get-
ting added to the main chain with respect to the maximum,
which defines orphan rate. In figure 5c and 6c the orphan
rate is initially in a stable range with the increase in the
number of nodes and then shoots up because of the network
congestion similar to figure 5b and 6b.
The duration of the time slot τ significantly affects the
orphan rate of CDAG as providing sufficient time for the
blocks to scatter in the network better utilize the network
resources. Figure 5c and 6c shows that the orphan rate is
largely lesser for the configuration with the higher values
of τ because of the higher stability achieved by the network
for each slot. A larger τ allows more number of concurrent
blocks to reach everyone in the network and get added to
the heaviest chain, resulting in a drop in the orphan rate.
Some inconsistencies in the initial part of graphs are be-
cause of a few blocks getting generated for each slot and
the randomness involved in the bucket selection process
while the generation of blocks. Selection of similar buck-
ets by the proposers in such cases can have a significant
effect on the percentage of discarded blocks in comparison
to stages when the block frequency is high.
9.4 Misbehaving Users
We show that Colosseum can handle malicious users by ran-
domly adding some percent of them in the network. These
users defy the protocol by not performing any of the tasks
of validators and keepers, but themselves play to propose
blocks. Figure 7a, 7b show the variation in the average time
for the rounds of Colosseum and the number of blocks get-
ting added to CDAG with the increase in the number of ma-
licious players. The average time for individual rounds of a
tournament increases with the number of malicious users
and the average number of blocks accepted per tournament
decrease. It is because the number of matches dropped by
malicious validators increase and more blocks get discarded
due to rise in the false-negative votes against matches of
honest players by malicious keepers. A little inconsistency
in results is because of the randomness involved in placing
the nodes over DHT and selecting validators and keepers
for the matches.
Figure 7c shows the minimum, average and maximum la-
tency of Colosseum and its variation with the number of
malicious users. It is evident that Colosseum confirms trans-
actions in less than two minutes (120 seconds) when approx.
20% of validators and keepers are not performing their tasks
honestly.
10 Limitations and Future Work
This paper discussed a new structure to store transactions
over a distributed ledger similar to the blockchain. The struc-
ture suffers from temporary forks even if users propose non-
conflicting blocks. It can be due to smaller time slots for the
barrier or low network bandwidth. A blockDAG kind of ap-
proach on top of CDAG to convergemultiple non-conflicting
forked chains can help to decrease the orphan rate further.
We do not discuss optimal configuration setting forCDAG
to achieve maximum throughput and minimum latency. A
detailed analysis of the configuration parameters and dis-
cussion on the trade-offs can be helpful to gain performance
and better utilize the resources. One can also explore game
theory techniques to have easily verifiable multi-player dis-
tributed games to filter out the nodes and select the block
proposals more efficiently and independently.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 7. For a varying fraction of malicious users, (a) Average time for one round of the tournament, (b) Average number
of blocks in each C-Block, (c) Min, Avg and Max transaction latency
11 Conclusion
CDAG is a new distributed data-structure to store transac-
tions as an alternate to blockchain and blockDAG. It scales
well with the number of nodeswhile maintaining the consis-
tency in its performance. It uses Colosseum to select multi-
ple block proposers in each time slot and use different buck-
ets of transactions to generate non-conflicting blocks. Un-
like other DAG based protocols, CDAG provides immedi-
ate finality to the blocks of the ledger and has a totally or-
dered structured by design. It is designed to have lower or-
phan rates for real-time scenarios and support smart con-
tracts. Experimental results for Colosseum demonstrate that
it achieves a throughput of more than 2000 tps and confirm
transactions in less than two minutes.
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